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INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) makes it unlawful
to discriminate against an individual in employment “because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”1 The Supreme
Court has since clarified that discrimination includes both harassment and
stereotyping based on a protected class.2 Legal scholars have increasingly
recognized and explored how intersectional discrimination, in which people
are discriminated against on the basis of more than one trait or characteristic,
relates to Title VII and other anti-discrimination laws.3 A key insight of
intersectional theory is that this kind of discrimination is not merely additive
(discrimination against Black women equals race discrimination plus sex
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Patrick Berning-O'Neill wrote this paper as a student at the University of Chicago Law School. He
graduated from UChicago in June 2021 and is now an attorney in Chicago. He would like to thank
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assignment that was the inspiration for the paper. He would also like to thank Matthew Guillod
and Brigid Larkin for their invaluable editing, and the American Constitution Society for hosting
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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (holding that a “hostile environment”
sexual harassment claim was viable under Title VII); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
251 (1989) (holding that discrimination based on sex stereotyping violated Title VII).
For an overview of intersectional scholarship, see Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris,
Intersectionality at 30: Mapping the Margins of Anti-Essentialism, Intersectionality, and Dominance Theory, 132
HARV. L. REV. 2193 (2019).
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discrimination), but that “categories may intersect to produce unique forms
of disadvantage.”4
For example, an employer willing to hire Black men and white women
might have a particular prejudice towards Black women with children as
“welfare mothers.” This sort of discrimination emerges from social attitudes
towards specific combinations of identities. But while it may seem intuitive
that intersectional discrimination is prohibited by Title VII, circuit courts are
split on how, or even whether, to allow intersectional claims.5 This is a
significant issue, since upwards of twenty percent of all Title VII claims
involve allegations of discrimination on multiple bases, amounting to tens of
thousands of claims every year.6 Where such claims are allowed, they are
usually subjected to significant doctrinal constraints and are substantially less
likely to succeed than single-basis claims.7 The Supreme Court has yet to
weigh in on intersectional discrimination, resulting in a proliferation of
different approaches across circuits.
This Article argues that claimants can use the existing Supreme Court
precedent of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.8 to contend that
intersectional discrimination is a “reasonably comparable evil” to the singlebasis discrimination contemplated by Congress in 1964, and therefore falls
under the broad and flexible interpretation the Court has applied to Title
VII’s “because of” language.
Part I introduces the background and current state of the law on
intersectional discrimination under Title VII. It surveys the development of
the foundational case law around intersectional discrimination and reviews
the current approaches to intersectional claims.
Part II examines the problems created by those approaches. This Part
considers a conceptual framework for understanding how the legal process
disadvantages intersectional claimants, reviews the existing empirical work
on intersectional discrimination, and surveys the inadequacies of the
predominant “sex-plus” framework.
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Rachel Kahn Best, Lauren B. Edelman, Linda Hamilton Krieger & Scott R. Eliason, Multiple
Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC. REV. 991,
993 (2011).
See discussion infra Part I.
See discussion infra Section II.A.
Id.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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Part III proposes that claimants and courts can rely on the existing
Supreme Court precedent of Oncale to allow a broader understanding of
intersectional claims under Title VII, which in turn will allow claimants to
overcome some of the key inadequacies in the current doctrine. In addition,
this Article argues that the relatively broad textual construction of Oncale
requires courts to allow at least some kind of intersectional claim.
I. TITLE VII AND INTERSECTIONALITY: A COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIP
Courts have confronted claims of discrimination based on more than one
protected characteristic since Title VII became law, though with mixed
results. This Part surveys the legislative history and administrative
framework of Title VII, analyzes the canonical cases involving intersectional
discrimination, and explores how courts have grappled (or not) with this
complex issue since the passage of the Civil Rights Act. While courts were
initially skeptical of intersectional claims, most circuits now allow them in at
least some form, though the predominant “sex-plus” doctrine is less than
ideal for intersectional plaintiffs.9
A. Title VII Background
What became the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was initially proposed by
President John F. Kennedy in a speech broadcast to the American people on
June 11, 1963, the same day Governor George Wallace prevented two Black
students from registering for class at the University of Alabama.10 After
Kennedy’s assassination, President Lyndon B. Johnson made the bill’s
passage a chief priority and signed it into law on July 2, 1964.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 established the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) to administer the statute. Title VII
gives employees who are discriminated against based on a protected category
a federal cause of action. The core of the statute makes it unlawful for an
employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,

9
10

See infra Section II.A.
John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights (June 11,
1963). Kennedy subsequently federalized the Alabama National Guard to enforce the
desegregation order. Id.
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terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”11
All Title VII employment discrimination actions begin with a charge filed
with the EEOC. The EEOC investigates these charges to determine if a
violation has occurred. If it finds a charge has merit, the EEOC will attempt
to administratively settle the charge or mediate a solution between the
employer and employee. If that is unsuccessful, the charging party may
request a “right to sue” letter from the EEOC, which gives permission to file
a Title VII action in federal or state court.12 The EEOC has the power to
bring lawsuits itself, but only does so in a small percentage of cases.13
Under the Title VII framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green,14 the claimant carries the initial burden of showing a prima facie case
of discrimination by establishing that: (1) they are a member of a protected
class; (2) they were qualified for the job; (3) they were subject to an adverse
employment action; and (4) that a similarly situated employee outside of the
protected class received better treatment.15 The burden then shifts to the
employer to present a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
action.16 If the employer is able to do so, the burden shifts back to the
claimant to show by direct or indirect evidence that the provided nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual.17
The EEOC has explicitly considered Title VII to encompass
intersectional claims since 2000 and considers “the issue of dual or
intersectional discrimination [] an important part of [their] Title VII
enforcement work.”18 However, this guidance has so far had a limited effect
11
12

13

14
15
16
17
18

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
For an overview of the charge process, see Filing a Charge of Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Nov. 14, 2019, 3:50 PM), https://www.eeoc.gov/filing-chargediscrimination [https://perma.cc/VM24-7WMZ].
See Filing a Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Nov. 14, 2019, 3:51 PM),
https://www.eeoc.gov/filing-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/7ULR-HDMK] (“The EEOC has
discretion which charges to litigate if conciliation efforts are unsuccessful, and ultimately litigates a
small percentage of all charges filed.”).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
See Davis v. Team Electric Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying the modern
understanding of the McDonnell Douglas framework).
Id.
Id.
Meeting of February 28, 2007, to Launch E-Race Initiative, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N (Sept. 29, 2019, 11:46 PM), https://www.eeoc.gov/meetings/meeting-february-282007-launch-e-race-initiative [https://perma.cc/V6U6-GDEN].
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on the behavior of courts. Some district courts have cited the EEOC
guidance in allowing claims of intersectional discrimination.19 But while the
Supreme Court held in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council20
that administrative agencies can receive significant deference for their
interpretations of the statutes they administer in some circumstances, it has
clarified that this kind of EEOC compliance guidance is not due that kind of
deference.21 Federal agencies can receive the less deferential Skidmore22
deference on a case-by-case basis, but courts have regularly declined to apply
Skidmore to the EEOC.23
B. DeGraffenreid and the “Intersectional Anti-Canon”
The first major case involving intersectional discrimination under Title
VII was DeGraffenreid v. General Motors.24 The plaintiffs, Black women
employed by GM, sued under a theory of a “combination of racial and sexbased discrimination,” alleging that GM’s “last hired-first fired” policy
harmed Black women particularly.25 The Eighth Circuit refused to recognize
Black women as a “special class to be protected from discrimination,”
upholding the district court decision that the plaintiffs could not “combine
remedies” to create a “super-remedy” which would give them relief “beyond
what the drafters of the relevant statutes intended.”26 The Eighth Circuit,
while noting it did “not subscribe entirely to the district court’s reasoning,”
upheld the ruling.27

19
20

21
22
23

24
25
26
27

Kimble v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765, 769–70 (E.D. Wis. 2010)
(citing EEOC guidance on allowing an intersectional claim for a Black male plaintiff).
Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res, Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“[C]onsiderable weight
should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted
to administer.”).
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc, 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1352 (2015) (finding EEOC guidelines
unpersuasive because they were inconsistent with earlier positions and promulgated only after
certiorari was granted); Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 361 (2013) (finding
EEOC guidance “lack[ed] the persuasive force that is a necessary precondition to deference under
Skidmore”).
DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff’d, 558 F.2d
480 (8th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 142–43.
Id. at 143.
DeGraffenreid, 558 F.2d at 484.
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DeGraffenreid was the first in what scholars have referred to an
“intersectionality anti-canon.”28 These cases, which include Rogers v. American
Airlines, Inc.,29 Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc.,30 Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club,31
and Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc.,32 involved Black female plaintiffs
alleging both race and sex discrimination whose Title VII claims were found
to be invalid. The initial wave of intersectionality scholarship was largely in
response to the anti-cannon cases.33 Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw, a
pioneering intersectionality scholar, identified these cases as the “doctrinal
manifestations of a common political and theoretical approach to
discrimination which operates to marginalize Black women” in antidiscrimination litigation and discourse.34 In this account, the results of these
cases exemplify the ways that the legal system and conventional antidiscrimination framework, which focuses on single-basis discrimination, fail
and marginalize Black women.35
C. Jefferies and “A Class Separate and Distinct”
Shortly after DeGraffenreid, the Fifth Circuit reached a much different
result, holding that Black women as a group are entitled to Title VII
protections in Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Association.36 Jefferies,
a Black woman, alleged she was discriminated against based on both race
and sex when she was denied a promotion.37 In contrast to DeGraffenreid, the
28
29
30

31

32
33

34
35
36
37

Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 713, 727 (2015).
Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F.Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (involving Black women challenging
a workplace ban on “corn row” hairstyles).
Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, 708 F.2d 475, 480 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming a lower court’s holding
that the Black female plaintiff inadequately represented white females or Black males in an
employment class action).
Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925, 942 (D. Neb. 1986), aff’d, 834 F.2d 697 (8th
Cir. 1987) (holding that the plaintiff, a Black woman, did not demonstrate Title VII intentional
discrimination on the basis of her being a Black woman).
Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, 565 F. 2d 895, 896 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding the Black female
plaintiffs lacked standing in a Title VII suit).
See Mayeri, supra note 28, at 727 (“The intersectionality anti-canon helped to inspire and inform a
new generation of scholarship and advocacy.”); see, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 141 (1989) (examining DeGraffenreid, Moore, and Payne
to “illustrate the difficulties inherent in judicial treatment of intersectionality”).
Crenshaw, supra note 33, at 150.
Id.
Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id.
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Fifth Circuit found “[t]he use of the word ‘or’ evidences Congress’ [sic] intent
to prohibit employment discrimination based on any or all of the listed
characteristics.”38 Given the purpose of the Civil Rights Act, the court
reasoned:
In the absence of a clear expression by Congress that it did not intend to
provide protection against discrimination directed especially toward black
women as a class separate and distinct from the class of women and the class
of blacks, [the court could not] condone a result which leaves black women
without a viable Title VII remedy.39

The Jefferies court also interpreted Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,40 which
was not discussed by the DeGraffenreid court, as requiring Black women to
allow claims on the basis of both race and sex.41 The Phillips court held that
different standards of treatment towards female employees with young
children could violate Title VII, even if the plaintiffs could not prove “bias
against women as such.”42 The Jefferies court reasoned that if women with
children were a protected subgroup under Title VII, it would be illogical not
to provide similar protections to the subgroup of Black women, which involve
two categories explicitly protected by the statute: race and sex.43
The Fifth Circuit concluded that “recognition of black females as a
distinct protected subgroup for purposes of the prima facie case . . . is the
only way to identify and remedy discrimination against black females.”44 An
employer could otherwise present evidence that it did not discriminate
against Black men or white women to “escape from liability for
discrimination against Black females,” even if such discrimination had in fact
occurred.45 While the facts of Jefferies involved Black women, it has been
interpreted to apply to generally to “subclass” discrimination, or
discrimination where only some members of a protected class are being

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id. at 1032 (emphasis added).
Id.
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1033.
Phillips, 400 U.S. at 543.
Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1034.
Id.
Id. at 1032.
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discriminated against on the basis of that class.46 The Jefferies approach has
since been adopted by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits.47
The Supreme Court has yet to directly consider the issue of intersectional
discrimination under Title VII, but Jefferies was cited approvingly in a
footnote by the majority in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring48 to support the
proposition that unlawful discrimination need not affect an entire class in
order to create a valid Title VII claim.49
D. Aggregation of Multiple Basis Claims
Courts have faced the related question of whether a claimant can
“aggregate” harassment along different lines (race, sex, religion, etc.) for the
purpose of establishing a hostile work environment if no single type of
harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive when considered alone. The
primary case for aggregation in a Title VII claim is Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.,50
in which a Black woman alleged that a combination of race and sex
harassment created a hostile work environment.51 The Tenth Circuit
considered the question of “whether incidents of racial harassment which
may, by themselves, be insufficient to support a racially hostile work
environment claim can be combined with incidents of sexual harassment to
prove a pervasive pattern of discriminatory harassment in violation of Title
VII.”52 The Hicks court, citing Jefferies, answered in the affirmative, holding
that “in determining the pervasiveness of the harassment against a plaintiff,
a trial court may aggregate evidence of racial hostility with evidence of sexual
hostility.”53 This was an important recognition of the way that different types
of prejudice can co-exist and become interwoven.

46

47

48
49
50
51
52
53

See Lam v. Univ. of Hawai’i, 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Jefferies for the proposition
that “[l]ike other subclasses under Title VII, Asian women are subject to a set of stereotypes and
assumptions shared neither by Asian men nor by white women”).
Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987) (“We are persuaded that
the Jefferies ruling is correct.”); Mosley v. Ala. Unified Jud. Sys., 562 F. App’x 862, 866 (11th Cir.
2014) (“This Court has recognized black females as a distinct protected subgroup under Title
VII.”).
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
Id. at 599 n.10.
Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1406.
Id.
Id. at 1415.
Id. at 1416.
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The Sixth Circuit, in Hafford v. Seidner,54 also concluded “[i]t would not
be right to require a judgment against [the plaintiff] if the sum of all of the
harassment he experienced was abusive, but . . . with no one category containing
enough incidents to amount to ‘pervasive’ harassment.”55 The Hafford court
also allowed for “the possibility that the racial animus of [the plaintiff’s] coworkers was augmented by their bias against his religion.”56 This approach
acknowledges the key intersectional concept that intersectional
discrimination is not merely additive (discrimination against Black Muslims
equals discrimination against Blacks plus discrimination against Muslims),
but can result in distinct and amplified forms of prejudice and harassment.
Similarly, the Second Circuit held in Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc.57 that “the
interplay between . . . two forms of harassment” could provide support for
the severity or pervasiveness of a hostile working environment claim.58 The
plaintiff in that case alleged both race-based and sex-based hostility, and the
court noted that a jury might find that “racial harassment exacerbated the
effect of . . . sexually threatening behavior and vice versa.”59 Since workplace
harassment must reach a certain threshold of severity or pervasiveness to
amount to a Title VII violation, this approach makes a remedy more likely
for victims of intersectional harassment. Several district courts in other
circuits have taken a similar approach.60
E. Lam And “The High Water Mark”
Lam v. University of Hawai’i,61 a 1994 case that expressly incorporated
intersectional concepts, is frequently considered the “high water mark” of

54
55
56

57
58
59
60

61

Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 515 (emphasis added).
Id.; see also Shazor v. Pro. Transit Mgmt., Ltd., 744 F.3d 948, 958 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Title VII does
not permit plaintiffs to fall between two stools when their claim rests on multiple protected
grounds.”).
202 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 572.
Id.
For example, Barfield v. Arizona, No. 09-00864, 2010 WL 3719221, at *5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 15, 2010)
(“A plaintiff may aggregate evidence of discriminatory harassment to show a hostile work
environment.”).
40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994).
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intersectional jurisprudence under Title VII.62 Lam, a female AsianAmerican professor at the University of Hawai’i, alleged she was subjected
to discrimination based on a combination of her sex, race, and national
origin.63 The Ninth Circuit, citing Professor Crenshaw’s then-recent article
on intersectionality,64 held that “the attempt to bisect a person’s identity at
the intersection of race and gender often distorts or ignores the particular
nature of their experiences” and that under Title VII, it is “necessary to
determine whether the employer discriminates on the basis of that
combination of factors, not just whether it discriminates against people of the
same race or of the same sex.”65
Lam’s impact outside of the Ninth Circuit has been muted. The current
EEOC guidance quotes Lam for the proposition that intersectional
discrimination is covered by Title VII.66 Some district courts have also cited
Lam to allow intersectional claims under Title VII.67 But while other court
of appeals have not openly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Lam,
none have subsequently adopted it.
F. An Attempted Solution: The “Sex-Plus” Doctrine
The so-called “sex-plus” doctrine is the most prevalent current approach
to intersectional discrimination. “Sex-plus” claims are those where “sex [is]
considered in conjunction with a second characteristic.”68 Most courts that
allow “sex-plus” claims trace them back to Phillips, though the Supreme

62

63
64
65
66

67
68

Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439,
1475 (2009) (“Lam represents the high water mark in this entire saga.”); see Mayeri, supra note 28,
at 730 (“The scholarly consensus seems to be that Lam . . . was the ‘high water mark’ for
intersectionality doctrine.”); Yvette N. A. Pappoe, The Shortcomings of Title VII for the Black Female
Plaintiff, 22 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 14 (2019) (“Lam . . . is considered the ‘high water mark’
within the intersectionality and Title VII jurisprudence landscape.”).
Lam, 40 F.3d at 1551.
Crenshaw, supra note 33.
Lam, 40 F.3d at 1562.
EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 18 (quoting Lam, 40 F.3d at 1561–62) (“Likewise, Title VII
protects Asian American women from discrimination based on stereotypes and assumptions about
them ‘even in the absence of discrimination against Asian American men or White women.’”).
Jeffers v. Thompson, 264 F. Supp 2d 314, 326 (D. Md. 2003); Johnson v. Dillard’s Inc, No. 033445, 2007 WL 2792232, *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 24, 2007).
Fisher v. Vassar College, 66 F.3d 1420, 1433 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Court did not use the phrase there.69 The doctrine is best encapsulated by
the frequently cited Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free School District,70 in
which the Second Circuit clarified that “[t]he term ‘sex plus’ or ‘gender plus’
is simply a heuristic . . . developed in the context of Title VII to affirm that
plaintiffs can, under certain circumstances, survive summary judgment even
when not all members of a disfavored class are discriminated against.”71
Under this approach, intersectional discrimination against Black women is
viewed as a subcategory of sex discrimination. This approach has been
adopted in the First, Second, Third, Sixth, and DC Circuits.72
The “sex-plus” doctrine limits intersectional discrimination claims to
those “based on one protected, immutable trait or fundamental right, which
are directed against individuals sharing a second protected, immutable
characteristic.”73 This limit derives at least in part from a concern that the
Jefferies approach could create “a many-headed Hydra, impossible to contain
within Title VII’s prohibition . . . protected subgroups would exist for every
possible combination of race, color, sex, national origin and religion.”74
Restricting the secondary characteristic to one that is either “immutable”
(like race or national origin) or that implicates a “fundamental right” (like
marriage) functions to substantially limit “sex-plus” claims.75 A workplace
69

70
71
72

73

74
75

Id. (“The Supreme Court [in Phillips] has adopted the proposition that sex considered in
conjunction with a second characteristic—’sex plus’—can delineate a ‘protected group’ and can
therefore serve as the basis for a Title VII suit.”).
365 F.3d 107, 118 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 118.
Rosencrans v. Quixote Enters., Inc., 755 F. App’x 139, 142 (3d Cir. 2018) (describing the burden
for a “sex-plus” claim); Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc, 561 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]he simple
question posed by sex discrimination suits is whether the employer took an adverse employment
action at least in part because of an employee’s sex.”); Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 374 F.3d
428, 432 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[I]n a ‘sex-plus’ or ‘gender-plus’ case, the protected class need not include
all women [but] the plaintiff must still prove that the subclass of women was unfavorably treated as
compared to the corresponding subclass of men.”); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“A
sex-founded impediment to equal employment opportunity succumbs to Title VII even though less
than all employees of the claimant’s gender are affected.”).
Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986); see Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1242
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (allowing claims of discrimination against a subclass of men or women based on
either an immutable characteristic or the exercise of a fundamental right).
Judge, 649 F. Supp. at 780.
Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (dismissing a Title VII claim
involving a workplace prohibition on “corn row” hairstyles because “it does not regulate on the
basis of any immutable characteristic of the employees involved”); see Guglietta v. Meredith Corp,
301 F. Supp. 2d 209, 214 (D. Conn. 2004) (holding that child-rearing is not a “sex-plus”
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policy prohibiting braids or dreadlocks would not be considered
discriminatory under Title VII even if it created a significant burden that
exclusively affected Black employees, because hair style is not an immutable
characteristic.
The Eleventh Circuit held just that in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management
Solutions,76 in which it upheld a decision allowing an employer to rescind a
job offer to a Black women with dreadlocks who would not cut off her hair.77
The employer’s only rationale was “they tend to get messy, although I’m not
saying yours are, but you know what I’m talking about” and the policy as
applied only affected Black employees. However, the court held that since
dreadlocks were a “mutable” characteristic, the prohibition did not violate
Title VII.78
Likewise, since the doctrine allows only a single “plus” characteristic, a
Black woman with young children would be restricted to two traits in a Title
VII claim (“woman plus Black”; “woman plus children;” or “Black plus
children”), because “Black plus woman plus children” exceeds the number
of “pluses” allowed.
The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have both expressly declined to decide
whether they recognize “sex-plus” claims, instead preferring to resolve recent
cases on more narrow grounds.79 This is significant, because in fiscal year
2019, courts within these circuits were responsible for roughly fourteen
percent of the total federal civil caseload.80 While some district courts within

76
77
78
79

80

characteristic protected by Title VII); see also EEOC v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 74-918, 1980 WL
288, *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 1980) (holding that a maximum weight policy for female flight attendants
did not violate Title VII because weight is neither an immutable characteristic nor a constitutionally
protected category).
852 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1035.
Id. at 1021, 1032.
Mosby-Grant v. City of Hagerstown, 630 F.3d 326, 337 n.4 (4th Cir. 2010) (explaining that
“[b]ecause the issue was not raised by Mosby–Grant, we decline to address whether she would have
been able to sustain a ‘hybrid’ sex and race claim under Title VII”); see Coffman v. Indianapolis
Fire Dep’t, 578 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that “[w]e have not yet decided in this
circuit whether we recognize a ‘sex-plus’ theory of discrimination”).
In the twelve months preceding June 30, 2019, 41,538 civil suits were commenced in the district
courts in the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, out of 293,520 nationally. See Table C-3—U.S. District
Courts–Civil Statistical Tables for The Federal Judiciary (United States Courts, June 30, 2019),
archived at https://perma.cc/LVB8-L2VF.
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these circuits have allowed such claims, others have not.81 As a result, for a
significant number of employees who may be subjected to some kind of
intersectional discrimination or harassment, a legal remedy may be uncertain
or unavailable.
II. INTERSECTING PROBLEMS: INTERSECTIONAL CLAIMS
The legal doctrine around intersectional discrimination has not evolved
in a vacuum, and its application has a substantial impact on how and even
whether those experiencing such discrimination in the workplace can seek a
Title VII remedy. Today, intersectional claimants are at a significant
disadvantage in court, even in jurisdictions that do allow some kind of
intersectional claim under Title VII. This is unfortunate, both because the
treatment of these claims in court often mirrors or compounds the
discrimination experienced in the workplace, and because claims of
intersectional discrimination make up a significant portion of the overall Title
VII caseload.
This Article examines the current state of intersectional claims in Part II
before proposing a solution based on developments elsewhere in Title VII in
Part III.
Section II.A discusses the mechanisms of intersectional
disadvantage and the practical effect of this disadvantage on plaintiffs.
Section II.B examines the specific shortcomings of the prevalent “sex-plus”
doctrine.
A. The Intersectional Disadvantage
Rachel Kahn Best and her co-authors, who did some of the foundational
empirical work on Title VII intersectional claims, propose a conceptual
framework that distinguishes between “demographic intersectionality” and
“claim intersectionality” in examining how intersectional claimants are
disadvantaged in litigation.82
Demographic intersectionality “occur[s] when discrimination . . . targets
plaintiffs who occupy the intersection of two or more demographic categories

81

82

See Kimble, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 769–70 (allowing a “race-plus” claim for a Black male plaintiff); cf.
Hunter v. University of Chicago, No. 17-3456, 2017 US District LEXIS 189587, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 16, 2017) (declining to “recognize such novel causes of action” as “race-plus” or “sex-plus”
claims absent action by the Seventh Circuit).
Best et al., supra note 4, at 993.
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. . . [because] overlapping axes of disadvantage may add up to more than the
sum of their parts.”83 Examples would include stereotypes of “docile” Asian
women or “radical” Muslim men. Intersectional claimants not only
experience this sort of disadvantage in the workplace, but critically, because
“[j]udges, juries, and lawyers are subject to the same institutional stereotypes
as are employers,” the same stereotypes that led to the initial discrimination
“may also affect court outcomes.”84
Claim
intersectionality
“is
present
when
plaintiffs
allege discrimination on the basis of two or more ascriptive characteristics”
in a legal claim.85 Examples would include a plaintiff claiming discrimination
based on both race and gender, or on both age and disability. Because antidiscrimination law tends view discrimination as “formal, one-dimensional
categories . . . legal doctrine often fails to capture the types of discrimination
suffered by intersectional subjects” and create procedural difficulties for
plaintiffs who are already less likely to succeed than single-basis claimants.86
Claim intersectionality is a “mechanism of disadvantage that is particular to
civil rights litigation.”87
Intersectional claimants encounter and are affected by both types of
intersectional disadvantage. In other words, “intersectionality disadvantages
plaintiffs both as a source of inequality in litigation and as a mismatch
between
legal
conceptualizations
and
actual
experiences
of discrimination.”88 This is reflected in outcomes: While white female
intersectional claimants are significantly more likely to succeed than nonwhite female intersectional plaintiffs (demographic intersectionality), all
intersectional claimants appear to suffer a disadvantage compared to singlebasis claimants (claim intersectionality).89
The effect is significant. In fiscal year 2018, the EEOC received 76,418
charges of workplace discrimination.90 The existing empirical work suggests

83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id. at 994.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 995.
Id. at 993.
Id. at 1009.
EEOC Releases Fiscal Year 2018 Enforcement and Litigation Data, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-releases-fiscal-year-2018enforcement-and-litigation-data [https://perma.cc/4TYZ-TFNH].

June 2022]

EXPANDING CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII

921

intersectional claims represent a substantial share of the resulting litigation.
Examining a randomized sample of 1,014 federal employment civil rights
decisions between 1965 and 1999, Best and her co-authors found that
eighteen percent of all such cases involved intersectional claims, which were
defined as claims alleging discrimination based on more than one protected
class.91 These were less than half as likely to succeed as single-basis claims of
discrimination, and the study found “strong evidence for the hypothesis that
[employment discrimination] law disadvantages plaintiffs who allege
intersectional discrimination.”92 The authors also found that intersectional
claims increased dramatically over that time, from around one hundred
annually in the 1970s to more than one thousand annually by the late 1990s,
by which point they represented twenty-five percent of all employment
discrimination cases.93
A more recent survey of the Eighth Circuit revealed similar numbers.94
Of the 162 employment discrimination cases appealed to the Eighth Circuit
between 2008 and 2010, 32.7 percent involved multiple claims.95
Intersectional claims were substantially less likely to make it past summary
judgement, with only 7.5 percent of multiple-basis claims surviving,
compared to 30.9 percent of single-basis claims. 96
If 25 percent of employment discrimination charges involve multiple
claims of discrimination, that amounts to tens of thousands of such claims
annually, with each claim potentially disadvantaged at every stage of the
process. This is a remarkable quantity, especially given the uncertainty and
disadvantage in even bringing such claims under the prevalent doctrine.
Given the scale of the issue, improvements in outcomes or efficiency would
have a significant impact on both claimants and federal courts.
Several factors may be at work in the claim intersectionality
disadvantage. One is administrative: The EEOC charge intake form is
usually filled out without an attorney present and presents a series of

91
92
93
94
95
96

Best et al., supra note 4, at 1000.
Id. at 1011 (finding only thirteen percent of intersectional claimants won at trial, compared to
twenty-three percent of single-basis claimants).
Id. at 1008.
Emma Reece Denny, Mo’ Claims Mo’ Problems: How Courts Ignore Multiple Claimants in Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 30 LAW & INEQ. 339, 355 (2012).
Id.
Id.
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checkboxes for types of discrimination.97 Mina Kotkin suggests this
“practically invites the filing of multiple claims that may lack a firm
foundation” by tempting potential claimants into checking all boxes which
fit some identity they possess.98 The intake form also does not distinguish
between multiple claims brought in the alternative (alleging discrimination
because of either race or sex) or intersectional claims.99 Another proposed
factor is that intersectional claims are just more likely to be frivolous or
fraudulent. Best and her co-authors quote a judge who thought plaintiffs
with multiple claims are “throwing spaghetti at the wall to see what sticks,”
or essentially adding frivolous claims to maximize their chances of
recovery.100 Under either theory, intersectional claims may fail because they
lacked merit at the outset.
This belief that multiple claims result from strategic behavior or
confusion, rather than the complex intersectional discrimination experienced
in the workplace, seems to drive significant judicial skepticism. Justice
Samuel Alito, then a judge on the Third Circuit, referred to multiple claims
as a “rather common tactic” in Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co.101 A
judge in the Northern District of Alabama, citing Judge Alito in Sheridan,
issued a special order strongly encouraging plaintiffs “to amend the
complaint to eliminate all claims of prohibited employer conduct except
one.”102
One of the plaintiffs, who had not alleged intersectional
discrimination in her complaint but had felt compelled to do so at trial,
appealed the order.103 The Eleventh Circuit, calling the case a “morass of
claims,” upheld the order with some modifications.104
Best and her co-authors directly addressed the question of whether the
claim intersectionality disparity results from poorer-quality claims. In their
analysis of the data, they concluded that intersectional claims were not

97

98
99
100
101

102
103
104

U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, FORM 290A: PRE-CHARGE INQUIRY,
https://www.eeoc.gov/sites/default/files/migrated_files/pre-charge-inquiry-form.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D7EY-5MNQ] (last visited May 31, 2022).
Kotkin, supra note 62, at 1460.
Id.
Best et al., supra note 4, at 1011 (citing Kotkin, supra note 62, at 1442).
Sheridan v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1085 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (presenting thirteen appellate court cases where he
believed the “tactic” had been used).
Harrington v. Cleburne Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 935, 941 (11th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 937.
Id. at 938.
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generally of lower quality.105 Instead, “intersectional claims are held back by
a combination of doctrinal barriers and judicial interpretations.”106
Best’s explanation is ultimately the most convincing. While the EEOC
charge intake process may encourage more multiple-basis Title VII charges,
there is significant winnowing before trial. After intake, a charging party will
meet with an EEOC Counselor, the complaint will be investigated and
evaluated by EEOC investigators, parties may engage in EEOC mediation,
and the charging party will usually retain counsel before filing a complaint.
This has an effect: In fiscal year 2018, the EEOC took in 76,418 charges of
employment discrimination, but during that same period, less than 12,500
employment discrimination suits were filed in federal district courts.107 It
seems difficult to credit the significant outcome difference to intake
paperwork mistakes given the process and likely presence of counsel by the
time a suit is filed, especially as the disparity seems to carry through to
appeals.
Other scholars have noted skepticism towards Title VII plaintiffs
generally based on a perception of “fakers and floodgates:” the belief these
claims are more likely to be meritless than other federal suits and create a
flood of litigation that creates administrability problems in the federal
courts.108 But neither concern is empirically true. Since 1999, there has been
a sharp drop in overall federal employment discrimination claims, and Title
VII claimants represent an increasingly small share of overall federal
litigation.109 Similarly, the available social science research indicates that
most employees, far from casually invoking Title VII, “are reluctant to
believe that they have been discriminated against and are reluctant to
complain formally.”110
While there is clearly an impression of low-quality multiple claims among
judges like Alito, Best’s analysis concludes that these claims are of similar
105
106
107

108
109
110

Best et al., supra note 4, at 1012.
Id. at 1018.
Charge Statistics (Charges Filed With EEOC), FY 1997 Through FY 2017, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/charge-statistics-charges-filed-eeoc-fy1997-through-fy-2020 [https://perma.cc/3T3R-SYSW]; Table C-2—U.S. District Courts—Civil
Federal
Judicial
Caseload
Statistics,
U.S.
COURTS
(Mar.
31,
2021),
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-2/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/2021/03/31
[https://perma.cc/GZ4N-U6A3].
Sandra F. Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Fakers and Floodgates, 10 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 223 (2014).
Id. at 237–38.
Id. at 240.
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quality to single-basis claims by the time they reach court and rejects the
argument that quality is the primary driver of the disparate outcomes.
B. “Sex-Plus” Problems
The predominant current doctrine for dealing with intersectional claims
is the so-called “sex-plus” framework. The consensus of interdisciplinary
scholars is that this framework is inadequate, doing “no more than
[acknowledging] the possibility of subclass discrimination” without providing
a useful way to address such discrimination. 111 Indeed, “[c]ourts more often
than not treat ‘sex-plus’ discrimination claims as opportunities to further
restrict Title VII relief” rather than a way to capture a distinct form of
discrimination.112
“Sex-plus” forces intersectional claimants to prioritize a particular
segment of their identity in the claim, with practical implications. Other
traits, even those protected by Title VII, are relegated to a secondary status,
which can create confusion over how to weigh evidence of harassment. It
forces victims of intersectional discrimination to “just pick two” in making
their claims.113 This regularly creates a situation where evidence of
discrimination based on two identically protected classes, like race or sex, is
treated differently for the purpose of Title VII litigation.114 As such, while
“sex-plus” is a somewhat more sophisticated version of articulating identity
than the single-basis approach, “[it is] ultimately still a facade for
discrimination that is structured around one factor.”115
These problems are well-illustrated by the examples of the Black single
mother and the Title VII hair cases. In an early article on intersectionality,
Peggie R. Smith used the hypothetical example of discrimination against
single Black mothers to illustrate the problems posed by claim
intersectionality:
In the past two years, an employer denied promotions to five of the nine
Black women who sought them. All five of the Black women who did not
111
112
113
114
115

Kotkin, supra note 62, at 1443 (2009); see also Mayeri, supra note 28, at 729 (arguing the “sex-plus”
analysis is “awkward” and “of limited utility”).
Regina E. Gray, The Rise and Fall of the “Sex-Plus” Discrimination Theory: An Analysis of Fisher v. Vassar
College, 42 HOW. L.J. 71, 87 (1998).
Bradley Allan Areheart, Intersectionality and Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII, 17 GEO. MASON
C.R.L. J. 199, 222 (2006).
Id.
Id.
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receive promotions were “single with children.” The four who did receive
promotions also had children but were married. In addition to the four
Black women who were married with children, the employer promoted
several other employees including four “single with children” white women,
two “single with children” Black men, and two “single with children” white
men.116

Because “sex-plus” claimants must “pick two,” they are restricted to three
possible theories: sex plus race; sex plus single with children; or (in some
jurisdictions) race plus single with children.117 But all of those theories give
the employer comparators that would cause the intersectional claim to fail:
The sex plus race claim fails because married Black women with children
were promoted; the sex plus single with children claim fails because the single
white women with children were promoted; and the race plus single with
children claim fails because the Black men with children were promoted.118
Even though we would expect these claimants to be protected by Title VII,
the “sex-plus” doctrine in this scenario “permits employers to discriminate
against them by relying upon invidious racial and sexual stereotypes.”119
Similarly, a series of cases upholding certain workplace grooming
requirements demonstrate some of the problems with the widely adopted
“immutable characteristic” requirement of the “sex-plus” doctrine. In Rogers
v. American Airlines, Inc.,120 a Black female plaintiff challenged a workplace
prohibition on “corn row” braids, arguing that the hair style “has been and
continues to be part of the cultural and historical essence of Black American
women.”121 The court dismissed the claim because “the grooming policy
applies equally to members of all races” and that hair style was an “easily
changed characteristic.”122 EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions123
reached a similar conclusion about dreadlocks, holding that “[s]ince Blacks
are not the exclusive wearers of dreadlocks, [testimony that dreadlocks are
primarily worn by Blacks] would not support Plaintiff’s claim that a
prohibition on dreadlocks discriminates against Blacks” and that Title VII

116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

Peggie R. Smith, Separate Identities: Black Women, Work, and Title VII, 14 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 21, 46
(1991).
Id.
Id. at 47.
Id.
527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Id. at 231–32.
Id. at 232.
11 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (S.D. Ala. 2014), aff’d, 852 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2016).
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“does not protect against discrimination based on traits, even a trait that has
sociocultural racial significance.”124
Paulette M. Caldwell gave Rogers as “an exemplar of employment
discrimination cases that involve black women’s physical image, negative
stereotypes of black womanhood, and the intersection of race and gender.”125
Caldwell noted that these sorts of “equally applied” grooming restrictions
predominantly affect Black women, and that the ostensibly neutral
prohibition forces Black women to conform to the “aesthetic standards of the
white society” in a way that helps the “perpetuation of social distinctions
between . . . blacks and whites.”126
These burdens are significant and quantifiable. Angela Onwuachi-Willig
attempted to provide concrete numbers for a hypothetical Title VII hair case
involving a requirement that hair be straight. “To straighten a black
woman’s hair through a relaxer costs approximately $60 to $300 for each full
permanent or $40 to $100 dollars for each touch-up in between full relaxers,
with either full relaxers or touch-ups occurring every four to eight weeks or
sooner.”127 The time burden is also significant, as relaxed hair can require
“two to three hours of work every few days.”128 The relaxers themselves,
which are often caustic substances like lye, can do lasting damage to hair,
cause significant pain, or even cause chemical scalp burns requiring medical
attention.129 Onwuachi-Willig quotes a journalist describing the result:
“[W]alk into a black salon and the most common thing you’ll see is a woman
gripping the armrests of a chair to manage her pain.”130
These grooming policies can create a significant workplace burden that
disproportionately affects a particular subgroup at the intersection of two
protected classes. But under the current approach, Title VII provides no
remedy in almost any jurisdiction.

124
125
126
127
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Id. at 1144.
Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J.
365, 372 (1991).
Id. at 392, 393.
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO.
L.J. 1079, 1114 (2010).
Id. at 1115.
Id. at 1116–17.
Id. at 1117 (quoting Francie Latour, Welcome to the Dollhouse: The Line the New Black Barbies Won’t Cross,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct 25, 2009, at K3).
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III. LOOKING AT HIVELY: THE ONCALE SOLUTION FOR INTERSECTIONAL
CLAIMS
Since the passage of Title VII, judges and claimants have lacked
authoritative guidance on how to treat intersectional claims in the absence of
action by Congress or the Supreme Court. Section III argues that a line of
Title VII sex discrimination cases could provide that guidance. Section III.A
proposes that the Supreme Court’s approach to interpreting Title VII in
Oncale could be applied to intersectional discrimination. Section III.B
explores the development of Oncale and its daughter cases, especially Hively.
Section III.C shows how the Oncale reasoning can be used to solve some of
the problems of intersectional claims discussed in Parts I and II.
A. The “Reasonably Comparable Evils” Approach
Even as the scholarship has advanced, “judicial opinions containing
thoughtful analysis of intersectional claims remain few and far between.”131
Intersectional claims simply lack direct Supreme Court precedent. However,
parallel developments in Title VII law around sexual orientation
discrimination can be adapted to intersectional claims. In particular, the
“reasonably comparable evil” logic of Oncale, recently relied on to expand
Title VII protections to sexual orientation and gender identity, provides a
compelling argument that Title VII allows or even requires courts to allow
broad Lam-style intersectional claims.
Scholars have noted the inadequacy of Title VII doctrine in dealing with
intersectional claims for decades.132 But despite this “these scholars . . . have
offered little in the way of guidance for the resolution of the everyday
employment discrimination action that is a concrete manifestation of
postmodern legal theory.”133 The solutions offered generally fall into three
categories: (1) amending the language of Title VII; (2) expanded or clarified
guidance from the EEOC; and (3) the Supreme Court resolving the issue by

131
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Mayeri, supra note 28, at 730.
Crenshaw, supra note 33, at 150 (arguing that the “common political and theoretical approach to
discrimination . . . operates to marginalize Black women.”); see also Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and
the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479, 2526 (1992) (discussing the conceptual failures of
Title VII in dealing with “complex” or intersectional subjects).
Kotkin, supra note 62, 1443 (2009).
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adopting a framework along the lines of Lam.134 These approaches have
failed to help plaintiffs, whose options are essentially “wait for Congress or
the Supreme Court to act” or “cite Lam and hope for the best.”
This Article argues that courts and commentators have overlooked
important and useful developments elsewhere in Title VII jurisprudence that
offer a way forward. First, even as the intersectional protections under Title
VII have stagnated, courts have significantly broadened the understanding
of the “because of . . . sex” provision of Title VII to extend workplace
protections to LGBTQ+ employees. Courts could take an analogous
approach to intersectional discrimination, understanding allegations of
intersectional discrimination involving at least one protected category to fall
under the “because of” language in Title VII. Second, the limitations
commonly placed on intersectional claims (like the “immutable
characteristic” requirement) derive from arguments about congressional
intent the Supreme Court has rejected in the Oncale line of cases.
B. Oncale and the Evolution of Title VII
The Supreme Court has substantially expanded the understanding of sex
discrimination under Title VII in a way that could be applied to
intersectional discrimination. This approach is best exemplified by Oncale.
The plaintiff, a male oil worker, brought a complaint against his employer
for workplace sexual harassment by male co-workers.135 Both the district
court and the Fifth Circuit held that, as a man, he had no Title VII cause of
action for harassment by male co-workers.136 The Supreme Court reversed
unanimously, holding same-sex harassment did fall under Title VII:

134

135
136

Yvette N.A. Pappoe, The Shortcomings of Title VII for the Black Female Plaintiff, 22 U. PA. J.L. & SOC.
CHANGE 1, 1 (2018) (arguing for clearer EEOC guidance, amending Title VII to include “or any
combination thereof,” and the Supreme Court adopting an intersectional framework); see Leticia
M. Saucedo, Intersectionality, Multidimensionality, Latino Immigrant Workers, and Title VII, 67 SMU L.
Rev. 257, 264 (2014) (advocating improved EEOC intersectional guidance in the context of
immigrant workers); Bradley Allan Areheart, 17 GEO. MASON UNIV. CIV. RTS. L.J. at 232–34
(2006) (arguing for both better EEOC guidance and the addition of “or any combination thereof”
to Title VII); see also Virginia W. Wei, Asian Women and Employment Discrimination: Using Intersectionality
Theory to Address Title VII Claims Based on Combined Factors of Race, Gender and National Origin, 37 B.C.L.
REV. 771, 811 (1996) (arguing for a Supreme Court ruling or statutory amendment to provide a
Title VII remedy for Asian women).
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77.
Id.
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We see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a
categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of
Title VII. . . . [M]ale-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was
assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted
Title VII. But statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to
cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our
laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are
governed. Title VII prohibits “discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex” . . .
Our holding that this includes sexual harassment must extend to sexual
harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements.137

The Supreme Court took a similarly expansive view of the “because of
. . . sex” language in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.138 The plaintiff alleged she
had been unlawfully passed over for a promotion because of “sex
stereotyping.”139 A partner at her firm described her as “macho” and
recommended she act more feminine to improve her chances for
partnership.140 The Court clarified that Title VII does not require an
employment decision be based entirely on gender, but rather that if “gender
played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a
finding of liability only by proving . . . that it would have made the same
decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account.”141 As
with Oncale, Price Waterhouse indicates that the “because of” language in Title
VII can and should be read broadly to protect employees against
discrimination, even if the particular form of discrimination was not initially
contemplated by the law, so long as the discrimination is reasonably
comparable to what the law was intended to remedy.
A more recent line of cases has cited Oncale in expanding Title VII
protections to discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity.
The first was Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana.142 The Seventh
Circuit considered whether the plaintiff, a gay woman, could file a claim
against her employer for sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII.143

137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Id. at 79–80, 82.
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Id. at 235.
Id.
Id. at 258 (emphasis added).
853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017).
Id.
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Relying on previous circuit precedent,144 the district court dismissed the
claim and was upheld on appeal.145 The full circuit finally reversed en banc,
recognizing that employment discrimination based on sexual orientation
provided a claim under the “because of . . . sex” language of Title VII.146
The Seventh Circuit understood the question as one of “pure . . . statutory
interpretation,” but rejected Ivy Tech’s argument that congressional intent
regarding Title VII should be determinative.147 The Hively court’s
“interpretive task [was] guided instead by the Supreme Court’s approach in
the closely related case of Oncale.”148 Under that approach, discrimination
based on sexual orientation, like same-sex harassment, was a type of sex
discrimination under Title VII even if “these interpretations may also have
surprised some who served in the 88th Congress.”149
The Second Circuit followed the next year in Zarda v. Altitude Express,
150
Inc. Applying “[the Oncale] reasoning to the question at hand,” the Second
Circuit held that “because sexual orientation discrimination is a function of
sex, and is comparable to sexual harassment, gender stereotyping, and other
evils long recognized as violating Title VII, the statute must prohibit it.”151
Soon after, the Sixth Circuit expanded Title VII protection to discrimination
against trans employees in EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.152
Citing Oncale, Price Waterhouse, Hively, and Zarda, the Sixth Circuit held that
“[d]iscrimination against employees, either because of their failure to
conform to sex stereotypes or their transgender and transitioning status, is
illegal under Title VII.”153 Zarda and R.G. Harris were granted certiorari and
consolidated with Bostock v. Clayton County Board of Commissioners,154 an
Eleventh Circuit case upholding circuit precedent that “specifically rejected
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See Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000); Hively v.
Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., No. 14-1791, 2015 WL 926015, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 3, 2015), rev’d, 853
F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017).
Hively, 853 F.3d at 341.
Id. at 351–52.
Id. at 343–44.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 345.
883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018), aff’d sub nom. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
Id. at 115 (emphasis added).
884 F.3d 560, 577 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted in part, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019).
Id. at 600.
723 F. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018).
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the argument that the Supreme Court precedent in Oncale . . . supported a
cause of action for sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII.”155
Writing for the Bostock majority, Justice Neil Gorsuch emphatically
confirmed the vitality of Hively’s broad textually approach to Title VII:
We agree that homosexuality and transgender status are distinct concepts
from sex. But, as we’ve seen, discrimination based on homosexuality or
transgender status necessarily entails discrimination based on sex; the first
cannot happen without the second. Nor is there any such thing as a “canon
of donut holes,” in which Congress’s failure to speak directly to a specific
case that falls within a more general statutory rule creates a tacit exception.
Instead, when Congress chooses not to include any exceptions to a broad
rule, courts apply the broad rule. And that is exactly how this Court has
always approached Title VII. Sexual harassment is conceptually distinct
from sex discrimination, but it can fall within Title VII’s sweep. Same with
motherhood discrimination. . . . As enacted, Title VII prohibits all forms of
discrimination because of sex, however they may manifest themselves or
whatever other labels might attach to them.156

Bostock also addressed arguments regarding Title VII and congressional
intent. “Certainly nothing in the meager legislative history of this provision
suggests it was meant to be read narrowly. Whatever [the reasons for
including the broad language], many, maybe most, applications of Title VII’s
sex provision were “unanticipated” at the time of the law’s adoption.”157 The
Court noted that, while some lower courts initially resisted innovations like
sexual harassment or pregnancy discrimination, “[o]ver time [] the breadth
of the statutory language proved too difficult to deny.”158
To date, the scholarly discussion of how Oncale should be applied to Title
VII has focused almost exclusively on extending protections to gender and
sexual minorities.159 This trend began almost immediately160 and continues
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Id. at 964–65 (citing Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 2017)).
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty Bd. Comm’rs, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1746–47 (2020) (citing Oncale and Phillips)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1752.
Id.
See Tyler Wolfe, The Institutionalized Othering of Sexual Minorities in Sex Discrimination Suits, 33 BERKELEY
J. GENDER L. & JUST. 141, 146 (2018) (“Price Waterhouse and Oncale paved the way for protections
for many trans individuals under Title VII.”).
See Patricia A. Cain, Stories from the Gender Garden: Transsexuals and Anti-Discrimination Law, 75 DENVER.
UNIV. L. REV. 1321, 1357 (1998).
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to the current day.161 Oncale was decided as a sex discrimination case, and its
application has generally been restricted to that category of discrimination.
This Article argues that this is an oversight. Nothing in the text of Title VII
distinguishes between discrimination based on sex and discrimination based
on race, color, religion, or national origin, and nothing prevents Oncale from
being applied broadly.
C. The Oncale Approach to Intersectional Discrimination
Discrimination against Black women is at least as “reasonably
comparable” to the kind of sex discrimination originally contemplated by
Congress as the same-sex harassment in Oncale or the discrimination in
Bostock, and it is less of a leap than extending the protections to sexual
orientation discrimination or sexual harassment. This Article argues that
Supreme Court precedent therefore allows, and perhaps even requires,
courts to permit fairly broad intersectional claims involving any of the
protected categories under Title VII. Allowing such claims would help
intersectional claimants with valid claims who are disadvantaged by current
Title VII doctrine.
Neither legislative action nor a definitive Supreme Court holding is likely
forthcoming and waiting will not be helpful to the tens of thousands of
plaintiffs who experience this discrimination each year. EEOC guidelines
have occasionally convinced district courts to allow intersectional claims, but
they are not binding and have not led to much progress on the issue. And in
the decades since Lam other circuits have not moved in that direction.
One oft-mentioned fix is the addition of the phrase “or any combination
thereof” to the text of Title VII.162 The legal scholars suggesting this do not
generally believe this change is necessary to allow intersectional claims, but this
proposed solution does speak to a perceived problem: It is unclear to some
judges if the text of the statute bears a reading that would allow these claims.
But the principle of Oncale can offer the same sort of clarification that a Title
VII amendment would, if less directly. Oncale, Price Waterhouse, and Bostock
stand for the proposition that “because of . . . sex” should be interpreted very
161
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broadly towards the underlying purpose of Title VII—combating workplace
discrimination—sweeping up “reasonably comparable evils” in addition to
the sort most directly contemplated by the 88th Congress.163 Discrimination
based on a combination of multiple characteristics protected by the statute is
certainly comparable to discrimination based on a single protected
characteristic.
The Oncale approach could provide intersectional claimants with several
benefits. First, claimants could argue that courts should allow single hybrid
claims of discrimination under Title VII. Similar to the claim aggregation in
Hicks and Hafford, a hybrid claim would “consider how the evidence of one
type of discrimination, such as age bias, supports an inference that another
type of discrimination, such as sex bias exists.”164 While Congress may not
have specifically contemplated such claims in 1964, Oncale tells us this does
not matter if the type of discrimination is reasonably comparable and the
claim falls under the broad “because of” language. Hybrid harassment based
on a combination of race and sex, for example, is certainly reasonably
comparable to discrimination based on either characteristic by itself.
Second, arguments for prohibiting or constraining intersectional claims
have generally relied on congressional intent in a way that goes against
Oncale. DeGraffenreid hinged on the belief that plaintiffs “should not be allowed
to combine statutory remedies to create a new ‘super-remedy’ which would
give them relief beyond what the drafters of the relevant statutes
intended.”165 Willingham v. Macon Telephone Publishing Co,166 a precursor to
Rogers that relied was on by the latter case, held that a grooming policy that
treated man and women differently did not violate Title VII because
“Congress sought only to give all persons equal access to the job market, not
to limit an employer’s right to exercise his informed judgment as to how best
to run his shop.”167 Oncale tells us that this inquiry into congressional intent
is neither determinative nor required in interpreting the scope of Title VII,
and provides a powerful counterargument against these results. As Oncale
states, “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover
reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws
163
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rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are
governed.”168
Willingham originated the “immutable characteristic” requirement which
has since become characteristic of the “sex-plus” approach. The court
arrived at its “narrow construction” in light of “the Congressional purpose”
of Title VII.169 “Congress in all probability did not intend for its proscription
of sexual discrimination to have significant and sweeping implications. We
should not therefore extend the coverage of the Act to situations of
questionable application without some stronger congressional mandate.”170
But Oncale, Price Waterhouse, and Bostock confirm this is precisely the wrong
way to approach Title VII. Price Waterhouse also provides an implicit rejection
of the “immutable characteristic” requirement. Hopkins was discriminated
against based on her “macho” behavior, a mutable characteristic, but she
still had a Title VII claim. Discrimination based on gendered behavior
expectations was ultimately still “because of . . . sex.”171
Similarly, the Rogers court, in holding that the grooming policy there did
not violate Title VII, understood the statute to be focusing a “laser of
prohibition” at “specific impermissible bases of discrimination.”172 But
Oncale, Price Waterhouse, and Bostock tell us that Title VII is not a narrow laser,
but rather a broad remedy against discriminatory workplace practices. That
a particular policy harming Black women may not have been contemplated
by Congress does not mean the plaintiff in Rogers should be denied a remedy
any more than the plaintiff in Oncale should have been.
Additionally, even if the “reasonably comparable evil” logic of Oncale does
not tell us how we must interpret Title VII, it serves to conclusively dismiss
the most common objections to allowing broad intersectional claims. That
Congress may not have intended the law to protect the subclass of “single
Black mothers” is not a valid objection to allowing that protection, provided
it is both a reasonable interpretation of the “because of” language of the
statute and a “reasonably comparable evil” to what was intended.173
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In light of Oncale and Bostock, courts should reject the narrow reading of
Title VII that has led courts to deny claims in cases like Willingham, Rogers,
and Catastrophe Management. Oncale clarified that the text of Title VII is
controlling. Since there was “no justification in the statutory language” for
a rule excluding same-sex harassment from the law, and since the broad
understanding of the “because of” language plausibly encompassed such
behavior, it fell under Title VII regardless of legislative intent.174 The
“immutable characteristic” rule was based on an early understanding of
legislative intent, which Oncale tells us is not controlling. Intersectional claims
based on mutable characteristics should not be disallowed because of that
perceived intent. A claim like Catastrophe Management would still need to meet
the other statutory requirements and the McDonnell Douglas framework, of
course. But, absent this artificial constraint, it would have a meaningful
chance of success, and could result in meaningful changes to discriminatory
workplace policies.
Judicial skepticism of intersectional claims has been posited as a
mechanism for their lower success rate.175 Basing the validity of such claims
in Supreme Court precedent may help overcome that skepticism in two ways.
First, it would provide a strong normative justification for allowing such
claims. Courts should conclude that Title VII covers intersectional
discrimination not because academics say so, but through the same method
of interpreting of Title VII the Supreme Court has used for decades. Oncale
tells us that “because of” is read broadly to protect employees, not narrowly
to prevent remedies against discrimination. As a result, it seems implausible
to read it in a way that would give less protection to those discriminated
against “because of” more than one protected category.
Second, having an authoritative precedent for permitting Lam-style
intersectional claims might allow more intersectional claimants to become
single claimants, through the hybrid claims discussed above, rather than
multiple claimants, which would have the practical effect of reducing the
judicial “spaghetti skepticism” Best and Kotkin identified.
Some might argue allowing more “pluses” or loosening the immutability
requirement will create a flood of complaints and federal intrusion into the
174
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workplace. But, as discussed in Section II.A, there is simply no evidence that
the “floodgates and fakers” concerns have any empirical basis. Allowing
cleaner intersectional claims would not create more problems than allowing
claims for workplace harassment or stereotyping did. If this change allows
for more successful suits, we would expect companies to revise policies rather
than engage in expensive litigation. Importantly, similar arguments about
scope and administrability were addressed in Oncale itself. “Respondents . . .
contend that recognizing liability for same-sex harassment will transform
Title VII into a general civility code for the American workplace. But that
risk is no greater for same-sex than for opposite-sex harassment and is
adequately met by careful attention to the requirements of the statute.”176
Title VII’s statutory requirements provide adequate protection against false
or frivolous claims.
The additional burdens imposed by current
intersectionality doctrine are unnecessary, and there is no evidence removing
them will create significant additional costs for courts and employers.
We can see how this would work by applying the “comparative method”
test used in Hively and Zarda to Smith’s hypothetical Black single mother. The
majority described this as a “tried-and-true . . . method in which we attempt
to isolate the significance of the plaintiff’s sex to the employer’s decision” by
examining whether, if “holding all other things constant and changing only
her sex, the plaintiff would have been treated the same way.”177 Hively’s
complaint alleged that “if she had been a man married to a woman . . . and
everything else had stayed the same, [her employer] would not have refused
to promote her and would not have fired her.”178 Using the comparative
method, the Seventh Circuit held that Hively’s claim was “paradigmatic sex
discrimination” under Title VII and sufficient to survive the motion to
dismiss.179
Zarda applied an analogous test to reach a similar result for its plaintiff, a
gay man alleging he had been fired because of his sexual orientation, and
therefore “because of . . . sex:”
To determine whether a trait operates as a proxy for sex, we ask whether the
employee would have been treated differently “but for” his or her sex. In
the context of sexual orientation, a woman who is subject to an adverse
employment action because she is attracted to women would have been
176
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treated differently if she had been a man who was attracted to women. We
can therefore conclude that . . . sexual orientation discrimination is a subset
of sex discrimination.180

Applying this method to intersectional discrimination, it is clear such
discrimination falls under Title VII’s “because of” language when it involves
protected classes. The “welfare mother” stereotype relies on a combination
of identities: Black, female, single mother. If a Black man or white woman
with children would not be subjected to the same treatment as the claimant,
the discrimination is “because of” sex or race. Under a pure sex
discrimination theory, a situation where a Black man would be treated
differently than a Black woman is “a subset of sex discrimination,” just as the
treatment in Zarda.181 In that situation, the intersectional discrimination
would fall under Title VII.
This sex discrimination analysis applies equally to race discrimination.182
If a single Black woman with children suffers an adverse employment action
where a single white woman with children would not, that treatment would
be a subset of race discrimination under the comparative method used in
Hively. While this may not have been what Congress intended, Oncale and
Price Waterhouse both tell us that (1) that intent is not determinative under Title
VII, and (2) the “because of” language can and should be read broadly to
apply to “reasonably comparable evils.” Under this approach, Smith’s Black
single mother should have a valid claim.
Using the broader reasoning of Oncale could also overcome some of the
barriers in the “sex-plus” doctrine. The objection that there are one too
many “pluses” for the Black single mother is not supported by the statute and
is rooted in approaches to congressional intent that have been rejected by the
Supreme Court. Relying on Oncale, the plaintiffs in Smith’s hypothetical of
the single Black mothers would no longer need to “pick two,” but would
instead be allowed to present their experience of discrimination in its full
context. This would both provide legal recognition for their particular
experiences and overcome an important procedural hurdle. Absent the
artificial, textual restrictions of the current doctrine, the hypothetical
comparators would no longer be sufficient to defeat the plaintiffs’ claims.
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To the extent we understand many types of intersectional discrimination
to be the result of pernicious stereotypes attached to categories protected by
Title VII, the Court’s acceptance of the sex stereotyping theory in Price
Waterhouse indicates those stereotypes should also be actionable. Why would
Title VII prohibit sex stereotyping of “macho” women but allow the
combination of race and sex stereotyping behind discrimination against
“Black welfare mothers?”
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that courts can and should allow a broader approach
to intersectional discrimination under Title VII by using existing Supreme
Court precedent. Subsequent to foundational cases like DeGraffenreid, the
Supreme Court has clarified that “because of” should be construed broadly
to encompass sexual harassment, same-sex discrimination, and sex
stereotyping. But intersectional jurisprudence has remained stagnant, even
as some courts have followed this logic to its natural conclusion by expanding
Title VII protections to LGBTQ+ Americans.
Using the approach to Title VII interpretation pioneered by Oncale,
expanded by Hively and Zarda, and confirmed by Bostock provides a simple
and compelling rationale for allowing broad intersectional claims like that in
Lam. This would provide an important tool to the tens of thousands of people
bringing claims of intersectional discrimination and harassment each year,
who the current system disadvantages at every stage. In the absence of a
clear expression by Congress that Title VII does not protect intersectional
claimants, we should not condone a result that leaves them “without a viable
Title VII remedy.”183

183

Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980) (explaining that
“[i]n the absence of a clear expression by Congress that it did not intend to provide protection
against discrimination directed especially toward black women as a class separate and distinct from
the class of women and the class of blacks, we cannot condone a result which leaves black women
without a viable Title VII remedy”).

